

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VALLET 01555 01 OF 03 011659Z POSS DUPE
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 AID-05 ACDA-12
XMB-02 COME-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
/094 W

-----038308 011836Z /46

R 011514Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8215

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VALLETTA 01555

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, MT, US
SUBJECT: MINTOFF'S REQUEST FOR A MARSAXLOKK LOAN

REFS: A) VALLETTA 1419, B) VALLETTA 1478,
- C) STATE 126507, D) STATE 130217

1. SUMMARY: WE DESCRIBE BELOW THE OPTIONS WE SEE AVAILABLE TO US IN RESPONDING TO MINTOFF'S REQUEST FOR A CONCESSIONAL LOAN FOR MARSAXLOKK. WE REVIEW THESE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NUMBER OF RECENT EVENTS WHICH HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WAY IN WHICH WE RESPOND TO THIS REQUEST. WE CONCLUDE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION, HAVING REGARD FOR OUR TACTICAL POSTURE WITH BOTH MINTOFF AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, THAT WE OFFER ACTIVELY TO FACILITATE MALTESE CASH PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS FOR MALTA UNDER THE EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM BUT THAT WE DECLINE THE REQUEST FOR A CONCESSIONAL LOAN. END SUMMARY.

2. HOW WE RESPOND TO MINTOFF'S REQUEST ON MARSAXLOKK, GIVEN THE INTERPRETATION HE HAS GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, HAS IMPORTANCE BOTH FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND FOR OUR POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE EUROPEAN DIALOGUE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VALLET 01555 01 OF 03 011659Z POSS DUPE

MINTOFF'S CONTINUING PURPOSE IS TO INVOLVE US IN THAT DIALOGUE - AT A MINIMUM TO BRING OUR PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE EUROPEANS TO BE RESPONSIVE IN MEETING HIS DEMANDS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN A POST-1979 TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. WHETHER WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING HIM THAT HE SHOULD NOT LOOK TO US TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN THAT OPERATION IS YET FAR FROM CLEAR. WHAT IS CLEAR

IS THAT ONE OF HIS PURPOSES IN THE MARSAXLOKK REQUEST IS TO DRAW US INTO THE PROCESS, AT LEAST IN AN INDIRECT ROLE.

3. THERE IS ANOTHER MINTOFF PURPOSE AS WELL. MINTOFF IS HOOKED ON THE MARSAXLOKK PROJECT AS THE ONE BIG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HE HAS GOING FOR THE FUTURE. IT IS TO HIM THE CENTERPIECE IN HIS CONVICTION THAT MUCH OF MALTA'S FUTURE ECONOMIC VIABILITY DEPENDS ON DEVELOPING MALTA AS A TRANSHIPMENT, PROCESSING, AND SERVICE CENTER FOR THIS PART OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. (IT IS NOT A BAD CONCEPT.) CONSISTENT WITH HIS PAST PRACTICE, HE WANTS TO CARRY OUT THE PROJECT IN HIS OWN SPECIAL WAY - TAPPING CAPITAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AT CONCESSIONAL OR GRANT TERMS FROM ALL AND SUNDRY, COMPLETING IT ON THE CHEAP, AND WITH A HEAVY EMPHASIS ON MALTESE LABOR AND ON DEVELOPING KNOW-HOW IN THE PROCESS. IN THIS CONTEXT HE WILL SEE OUR RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST HE HAS MADE OF US AS HEAVILY INDICATIVE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO HELP IN THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT TO A POST-MILITARY BASE ECONOMY THAT HE ENVISAGES FOR MALTA. OUR RESPONSE WILL THEREFORE IMPACT ON OUR FUTURE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL.

4. THOSE ARE MINTOFF'S PURPOSES. OURS WE ASSUME IS NOT SIMPLY TO AVOID GETTING INVOLVED WITH MALTA (ON WHICH WE FEAR WE SOMETIMES EXCESSIVELY FOCUS OUT OF IRRITATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VALLET 01555 01 OF 03 011659Z POSS DUPE

WITH MINTOFF'S STYLE AND PAST RECORD). OUR OVERRIDING PURPOSE, GIVEN WHAT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IS NO GIVE ON MINTOFF'S PART ON THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HIS NEUTRALITY CONCEPT, IS TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO ASSURE SOVIET DENIAL. THAT MEANS PRESERVING ENOUGH OF A ROLE, BOTH WITH MINTOFF AND WITH THE EUROPEANS, TO HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON WHAT THE DIALOGUE WITH THE EUROPEANS PRODUCES.

5. OUR RESPONSE THEREFORE ALSO HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE EUROPEANS, WHICH IS THAT WE LOOK TO THEM TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF WHATEVER ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED TO ASSURE MINIMAL WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS IN MALTA IN THE POST-1979 PERIOD, AS WELL AS TO HELP MALTA ADJUST ECONOMICALLY TO THE ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE CLOSURE OF THE UK/NATO BASE. THE NATURE OF OUR RESPONSE TO A CONCESSIONAL LOAN ON MARSAXLOKK, AT A TIME WHEN THE EUROPEAN DIALOGUE ON AID TO MALTA HAS YET TO RESUME, WILL BE INDICATIVE TO OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES OF THE STRENGTH OF OUR RESOLVE.

6. THIS IS THE POLICY CONTEXT IN WHICH WE REVIEW OUR OPTIONS BELOW. WE CONSIDER THEM ALSO IN LIGHT OF THE

FOLLOWING SPECIFIC EVENTS:

- (A) THE FELICE VISIT TO WASHINGTON ITSELF, WHICH FROM
- MINTOFF'S VIEWPOINT AT LEAST HAS OPENED UP A DIRECT
 - HIGH-LEVEL US/MALTESE DIALOGUE WITH EXPECTATIONS
 - THAT NEED TO BE RECKONED WITH.

- (B) PROGRESS IN THE EUROPEAN/MALTESE DIALOGUE REGARDING
- THE SECURITY COMPONENT OF THE SO-CALLED NEUTRALITY
 - GUARANTEE FOR MALTA.

- (C) OUR INTERVENTION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE EUROPEAN/
- MALTESE DIALOGUE ON AN ISSUE WHICH CONCERNS US -

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VALLET 01555 02 OF 03 011733Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-08 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05
XMB-02 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
/094 W

-----038510 011836Z /46

R 011514Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8216

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 VALLETTA 01555

- DENIAL OF MILITARY ACCESS BY THE SUPERPOWERS TO THE
- MALTA DRYDOCKS.

- (D) ONE NONEVENT - NO PROGRESS ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF
- THE EUROPEAN/MALTESE DIALOGUE, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE
 - ONLY 10 MONTHS TO GO BEFORE THE TERMINATION OF THE
 - UK/NATO BASE AGREEMENT.

7. WE SEE THREE OPTIONS AVAILABLE IN DEALING WITH
MINTOFF'S REQUEST WHEN WE HAVE THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT HE
SEEKS FROM US:

- (A) SAY NO NOW AND STAND BY IT, RE-EMPHASIZING OUR VIEW
- THAT MALTA SHOULD LOOK TO EUROPE FOR ANY AND ALL
 - ASSISTANCE.

(B) CONTINUE TO STRING MINTOFF ALONG ON THIS PARTICULAR

- REQUEST, AVOIDING A DECISION UNTIL THE EUROPEAN
- DIALOGUE MOVES FURTHER ALONG.

(C) SAY YES NOW, OR IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE.

8. CONSISTENCY WITH OUR RHETORIC COMMENDS OPTION (A),
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VALLET 01555 02 OF 03 011733Z

SAYING NO. INDEED, THERE IS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR SAYING NO IMMEDIATELY, EVEN BEFORE WE HAVE THE GOM LIST FOR MARSAXLOKK, SINCE PERSISTING WITH A REQUEST FOR A LIST OBVIOUSLY BUILDS EXPECTATIONS EVEN BEYOND WHERE THEY ARE NOW. SAYING NO TO THIS REQUEST, AT THE SAME TIME REITERATING OUR BASIC STANCE THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD CARRY THE BALL ON ASSISTANCE, WILL GIVE BOTH MINTOFF AND THE EUROPEANS MORE TIME TO ADJUST TO THIS REALITY. IT WILL STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY OF WHAT WE HAVE SAID ABOUT WANTING MALTA HANDLED AS A REGIONAL ISSUE. WE WILL NOT BE STOKING UNREALIZABLE MINTOFFIAN EXPECTATIONS. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT AGREEING TO THE MARSAXLOKK REQUEST WILL END MINTOFF'S PRESSURES ON US; THE REVERSE IS MORE LIKELY IF MINTOFF'S PAST RECORD IS INDICATIVE. CHOOSING THIS OPTION HOWEVER WILL INEVITABLY IMPACT ADVERSELY ON OUR BILATERAL ROLE HERE, GIVEN MINTOFF'S EXPECTATIONS. IT COULD LIMIT WHATEVER INFLUENCE WE MIGHT SEEK TO APPLY TO INFLUENCE HIS FUTURE POLICIES. IT REQUIRES A JUDGMENT THAT MINTOFF WILL STICK BY HIS NEUTRALITY POLICY, SUFFICIENTLY TO ASSURE OUR MINIMAL INTERESTS, REGARDLESS OF OUR REJECTIONS OF HIS REQUESTS FOR CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE.

9. OPTION (B), PLAYING FOR TIME BY DEFERRING A DECISION, ASSUMES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THAT WE HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY UNDER CURRENT AID LEGISLATION TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THIS REQUEST ULTIMATELY IF WE CHOOSE TO DO SO. CHOOSING THIS OPTION HAS SOME ADVANTAGE IF WE CAN USE IT IN A WAY THAT KEEPS THE PRESSURE ON BOTH MINTOFF AND THE EUROPEANS TO WORK OUT SOMETHING ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES (AND TO US). IT ALSO LEAVES US THE FLEXIBILITY OF EITHER BEING RESPONSIVE TO THIS REQUEST AT A LATER DATE OR MAKING SOME OTHER GESTURE SUPPORTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VALLET 01555 02 OF 03 011733Z

ROLE WHEN WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT THIS IS GOING TO BE. THE DISADVANTAGE WITH THIS OPTION IS THAT IT GIVES

MINTOFF A LEVER TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON US; AS LONG AS THERE IS THE FAINTEST RAY OF HOPE, MINTOFF WILL EXPLOIT IT TO THE MAXIMUM. THE EUROPEANS MAY DO THE SAME, SHOULD THEY SENSE AN APPARENT WAVERING ON OUR PART FROM OUR PREVIOUS INSISTENCE THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE LOOKED TO FOR CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE TO MALTA. THIS APPROACH HAS A FURTHER DISADVANTAGE IN THAT THE LONGER WE DEFER A RESPONSE, REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY REPRESENTATIONS WE MAKE TO HIM ABOUT THE LOW PROBABILITY OF OUR BEING ABLE TO PROVIDE A SOFT LOAN, THE MORE MINTOFF'S HOPES WILL INCREASE, AND THE MORE ADVERSE HIS REACTION SHOULD WE SAY NO AT A LATER DATE. CHOOSING THIS OPTION PRESUPPOSES A JUDGMENT ON OUR PART THAT, REGARDLESS OF HOW LONG WE STRING MINTOFF ALONG, AND EVEN IF OUR ULTIMATE ANSWER IS NO, HIS OWN INTERESTS IN PRESERVING MALTA'S NEUTRALITY STATUS WILL INHIBIT HIM FROM TAKING ACTIONS AGAINST OUR INTERESTS.

10. SAYING YES NOW, OPTION (C), WOULD CERTAINLY SOLVE OUR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS WITH MINTOFF, BUT ONLY IN THE NEGATIVE SENSE. IT WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS APPROACH TO THE 1979 ISSUE NOR HIS NEUTRAL NON-ALIGNED POLICY; RATHER IT COULD TEND TO REINFORCE IT. IT COULD COMPLICATE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE EUROPEANS WHICH HAS NOT EVEN BEGUN. SELECTING THIS OPTION WOULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE AND CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE EUROPEANS TO INSURE THAT MINTOFF WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY US OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER. THE ULTIMATE RATIONALE FOR SELECTING THIS OPTION RESTS ON A JUDGMENT THAT DELAY AND POSSIBLE LATER REJECTION OF THE LOAN REQUEST WOULD RESULT IN ACTIONS PREJUDICIAL TO OUR INTERESTS BY MINTOFF VIS-A-VIS THE RUSSIANS IF WE DID NOT SOON DEMONSTRATE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HIS PROBLEMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VALLET 01555 03 OF 03 011734Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-08 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05
XMB-02 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
/094 W

-----038550 011835Z /46

R 011514Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8217

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 VALLETTA 01555

11. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THIS YES OPTION WOULD BE TO PURSUE A MINTOFFIAN BARGAINING APPROACH; NAMELY A "YES BUT" TECHNIQUE. WE COULD TELL MINTOFF THAT WE WOULD FAVORABLY CONSIDER HIS REQUEST IF HE IN TURN IS PREPARED TO DO CERTAIN THINGS FOR US; MEANING SOME DEPARTURE FROM HIS PRESENT RIGID POSTURE ON NEUTRALITY. THE QUESTION HERE IS WHETHER WE WANT OR NEED ANYTHING FROM MINTOFF ENOUGH TO PAY FOR IT (E.G. PORT CALLS, ACCESS TO DRYDOCKS, ETC., BUT WITHOUT COMPARABLE SOVIET PRIVILEGES) AND WOULD MINTOFF GO ALONG. WE DEFER TO WASHINGTON ON THE FIRST; WE ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE SECOND. NEVERTHELESS, SHOULD WE DECIDE TO EXTEND CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE TO MINTOFF, NOW OR LATER, WE SHOULD AT LEAST CONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT ASK IN RETURN, BEYOND CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY DENIAL.

12. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? WE CAN EXPECT TO HAVE MINTOFF'S LIST SHORTLY, AT WHICH POINT WE WILL NEED TO COME TO A DECISION AS TO HOW TO HANDLE HIS REQUEST. WE EXCLUDE OPTION (C) - ACQUIESCING IN THIS REQUEST NOW - IT BUYS US NOTHING WITH EITHER MINTOFF OR THE EUROPEANS IN TERMS OF THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL SITUATION. BASED ON CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VALLET 01555 03 OF 03 011734Z

OUR ANALYSIS OF MINTOFF'S OWN INTERESTS IN PERSEVERE WITH HIS NEUTRALITY POLICY AS WELL AS MALTA'S FAVORABLE ECONOMIC SYSTEM THIS OPTION APPEARS UNNECESSARY TO ATTAIN OUR MINIMAL OBJECTIVE HERE. THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN OPTION (B) - DELAYING A DECISION - BUT WE WOULD NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT DELAY FEEDS EXPECTATIONS ON THE PART OF BOTH MINTOFF AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND COULD DISTRACT BOTH PARTIES FROM THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM.

13. BARRING CONTENT IN THE ACTUAL LIST OF A KIND THAT WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION SUBSTANTIALLY (WHICH WE DOUBT), OUR PRESENT JUDGMENT IS THAT WE TELL MINTOFF NOW WHY WE CANNOT MEET HIS REQUEST FOR A CONCESSIONAL LOAN FOR MARSAXLOKK. IT SERVES NOTICE ON THE EUROPEANS THAT WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ABOUT THEIR CARRYING THE BALL ON MALTA. IT TELLS MINTOFF EARLY ON THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO RUN SCARED. IT RESTS ON OUR CONCLUSION THAT MINTOFF'S OWN INTERESTS WILL KEEP HIM FROM ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIANS OF ANY REAL DANGER OF OUR INTERESTS.

14. MINTOFF WILL BE VERY DISAPPOINTED. HIS REACTION IN TERMS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS MAY BE SHARP BUT WE

BELIEVE MANAGEABLE; THERE ARE ASPECTS TO THOSE RELATIONS THAT MATTER A GOOD DEAL TO HIM, INCLUDING HIS HOPES FOR AMERICAN INVESTMENT. WE WOULD REMIND MINTOFF OF WHAT WE HAVE SAID ALL ALONG THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE LOOKED TO FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THAT WE HAVE NONETHELESS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE REQUEST FOR A CONCESSIONAL LOAN FOR MARSAXLOKK AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT COMPARED WITH OTHER PRIORITY CLAIMANTS ON OUR LIMITED AID RESOURCES, MALTA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS DO NOT JUSTIFY OUR MAKING AN EXCEPTION FOR MALTA. (THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR CONCESSIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VALLET 01555 03 OF 03 011734Z

MONEY TO BUY EXCESS PROPERTY FROM US; HE HAS ADEQUATE FUNDS ALREADY AVAILABLE.) WE WOULD SAY THAT WE RECOGNIZE MALTA FACES ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS IN THE TERMINATION OF THE UK/NATO BASE BUT THAT WE BELIEVE THESE ARE FULLY MANAGEABLE WITH THE COOPERATION OF ITS EUROPEAN (AND OTHER) NEIGHBORS. IN THAT PROCESS WE SEE FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INCLUDING AMERICAN, PLAYING A STRONG ROLE AND WE INTEND TO CONTINUE ENCOURAGING POTENTIAL AMERICAN INVESTORS TO CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES THAT MALTA OFFERS. FINALLY WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE READY TO GO THE EXTRA MILE IN FACILITATING MALTESE PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS ON ITS LIST FOR MARSAXLOKK UNDER OUR EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM ON A CASH BASIS. (WE WOULD LIKE THE DEPARTMENT TO CONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT SPECIFICALLY OFFER TO DO IN THIS RESPECT.)

15. WHAT ALL THIS BOILS DOWN TO IS THAT THIS IS THE WRONG TIME FOR A CONCESSIONAL LOAN TO MALTA, EVEN IF WE WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD GET INVOLVED IN THIS OR SOME OTHER WAY IN PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS IN POST-1979 MALTA. OBVIOUSLY NOTHING PRECLUDES OUR ULTIMATELY COMING TO THAT CONCLUSION, BUT WE SHOULD LET THE EUROPEAN DIALOGUE EVOLVE A GOOD DISTANCE YET BEFORE WE DO SO - UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT CONCLUDES THAT BY HOLDING THE ISSUE OPEN (AND THUS INDIRECTLY INVOLVING OURSELVES IN THE AID DIALOGUE) WE WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF GETTING THE EUROPEANS AND MINTOFF TO STRIKE A DEAL THAT MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS BUT STILL AT MINIMAL COST TO US.

LAINGEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, LOANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978VALLET01555
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780229-1155
Format: TEL
From: VALLETTA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197806105/aaaadmma.tel
Line Count: 378
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 28b4417d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 VALLETTA 1419, 78 VALLETTA 1478
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2153357
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINTOFF'S REQUEST FOR A MARSAXLOKK LOAN
TAGS: PEPR, MT, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/28b4417d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014